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CIVIL RIGHTS-SEX DISCRIMINATION -TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1972-IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION-The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a private right of action can
be implied for victims of sex discrimination under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
After being denied admission to two private, federally funded medi-
cal schools,1 Geraldine Cannon, a white, thirty-nine year old female,
filed a complaint with the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) alleging sex discrimination by the universities in violation
of section 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).2 Three
months later, she instituted suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois against the private universities,' alleg-
ing violations of Title IX. The district court determined that the uni-
versities' motion to dismiss the complaint should be granted because
no private right of action was expressly authorized by Title IX nor
could one be properly inferred.'
1. Cannon was denied admission to medical schools of the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University. Both schools had a policy against admitting applicants who
were more than thirty years old, at least if they did not have graduate degrees. North-
western University absolutely disqualified applicants who were more than thirty-five
years old. The receipt of federal funds by the medical schools at the time Cannon was
denied admission was conceded arguendo by the schools' motion to dismiss the complaints.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 680 (1979). Cannon alleged that age and ad-
vance degree criteria operated to exclude more women than men from admissions con-
sideration, since the higher education of women is interrupted more frequently than that
of men. Id. at 680 n.2.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Section 901 of Title IX provides in relevant part that: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. Section 901 applies to the ad-
missions policies of institutions of vocational education, professional education, graduate
higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education. Institu-
tions run by religious organizations are specifically exempted if application of the section
would be inconsistent with their religious tenets. United States military service educa-
tional institutions and public institutions of undergraduate higher education which have
traditionally and continually had a policy of admitting only one sex are also exempted
from the prohibitions of § 901. Special time considerations are given to schools that are in
the process of abandoning a single sex admission policy. Id.
3. At the time suit was filed, HEW's only response to Cannon's complaint was an
acknowledgment letter. She later amended her complaint to include HEW as a defendant
and requested injunctive relief ordering the administrative agency to complete the in-
vestigation. 441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
4. 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1976). The suit also alleged violations of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), the Age Discrimination in Employment
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the district court that no private right of action could be implied
for a violation of section 901." As mandated by the controlling case of
Cort v. Ash,' the court of appeals searched for legislative intent to
create or deny a private right of action. The court noted that the pro-
visions of Title IX were based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VI).' Because Title VI had not been interpreted to confer a
private cause of action, the court reasoned that Congress did not in-
tend to confer such a right under Title IX.' The Seventh Circuit also
found that the administrative remedies contained in section 902 of Ti-
tle IX9 were intended by Congress to be the exclusive means of en-
forcement."
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), and the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 295h-9
(1976) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 292d (1976)). These counts were also dismissed by the
district court. The petitioner sought review only of the Title IX issue in the Supreme
Court. 441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
5. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
6. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The test enunciated in Cort v. Ash required an examination of
four factors to determine whether a private cause of action is implied in a statute: 1)
whether the statute was enacted to benefit a special class of persons; 2) whether the
legislature intended to create or deny a private right of action; 3) whether implying a
private right of action would be consistent with the legislative purpose; and 4) whether an
implied right of action would interfere with a traditional state concern. Using these
criteria, the Court in Cort v. Ash decided that shareholders had no cause of action against
corporate directors under 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
8. 559 F.2d at 1072. The court of appeals distinguished Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), a class action suit alleging unequal educational opportunities in violation of the
fourteenth amendment and Title VI as involving a constitutional right of a large number
of plaintiffs. 559 F.2d at 1072. Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967) was distinguished on the same ground. 559 F.2d at 1072.
Bossier was a class action by black children on an Air Force base against the public
school they attended alleging segregation in violation of the fourteenth amendment, Title
VI and contractual assurances between the federal government and the school.
9. Section 902 of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), authorizes each federal depart-
ment and agency that extends federal funds to educational programs to issue regulations
effectuating the Act's provisions, and to terminate funds to noncomplying recipients only
if attempts to obtain voluntary compliance have been unavailing and an opportunity for a
hearing has been afforded. Section 903 of the Act provides for judicial review of a funding
termination. 20 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
10. 559 F.2d at 1073. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) for an explanation of the doctrine of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. The doctrine of expressio unius was implicitly rejected by the
holding in Cort v. Ash, because if the requisite factors exist, a right of action can be im-
plied even though another remedy is set forth in the statute. 422 U.S. at 79.
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Shortly after the court of appeals' decision was announced, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Attor-
ney's Fees Act),'1 which authorized court-awarded attorney's fees to
prevailing parties in actions to enforce Title IX. In light of the enact-
ment, the court of appeals granted a rehearing to consider if its original
interpretation of Title IX was correct. The court read the legislative
history of the Attorney's Fees Act as demonstrating that the new
legislation was not intended to amend Title IX to include an express
cause of action. Instead, the court reasoned that the supporters of the
enactment meant only to provide attorney's fees in the event that an
implied right of action did exist under Title IX.12 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari" to decide whether a private right
of action could be implied under Title IX. Deciding that a private right
of action could be implied, the Court reversed and remanded the deci-
sion of the court of appeals."
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 5 began his analysis by
noting that the four factors set forth in Cort v. Ash" must be exam-
ined to determine whether a private cause of action exists under Title
IX. The Court looked first to the specific language of Title IX'1 to
decide if the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class of
which Cannon was a member. The Court relied heavily on this factor
and noted that historically a private right of action has been implied
when a particular class is named as the beneficiary in the statute.
However, a private right of action is not implied if the statute was
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The statute allows the court to award fees in any action
or proceeding brought to enforce the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986,
2000d (1976), or 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
12. 559 F.2d at 1077-80. At the rehearing, HEW took the position that it would be
proper to imply a private cause of action under Title IX. Prior to the rehearing, HEW had
argued the contrary position in the Cannon suit. 441 U.S. at 687 n.8. The court of appeals
rejected the agency's interpretation at rehearing. 559 F.2d at 1077-80. In its brief sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court, HEW maintained that it had taken the position as early as
1974 that an implied right of action existed under Title IX in certain circumstances. The
agency explained that its inconsistent position in the earlier stages of litigation was due
to communication problems between national and regional HEW offices. 441 U.S. at 687
n.8.
13. 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
14. 441 U.S. at 717.
15. The Court was divided 6-3 in the judgment. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
and Rehnquist joined in the majority opinion. Justice Rehnquist also filed a concurring
statement in which Justice Stewart joined. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judg-
ment. Justices White, Blackmun and Powell dissented.
16. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See note 6 supra.
17. See note 2 supra for the content of Title IX.
1980 985
Duquesne Law Review
enacted for the protection of the general public.'8 The majority con-
cluded that the first factor of Cort weighed heavily in favor of Cannon,
since the language of Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit upon vic-
tims of sex discrimination. 9
The second factor for analysis outlined in Cort, legislative intent,
received extensive treatment by Justice Stevens. He noted that legis-
lative histories are typically silent on the question of a private right of
action. He pointed out that when the language of the statute shows an
intent to benefit a special class of persons, it is not necessary to find
evidence of legislative intent to create a private cause of action. In-
stead, the legislative history should be searched for intent to deny a
cause of action.2' The Cannon majority found no intent to deny a pri-
vate right of action under Title IX, but did find an intent to create
such a right.2' Justice Stevens noted that Title IX was patterned after
Title VI,2 in that both statutes use identical language to confer the
desired benefit and also have the same administrative enforcement
schemes. Moreover, the legislative history revealed that Congress in-
tended Title IX to be interpreted in the same manner as Title VI had
been interpreted since its passage in 1964.' This aspect of the legisla-
tive history was very important to Justice Stevens, because he believed
that a private right of action had been implied under Title VI prior to
the 1972 enactment of Title IX. The Court noted that in 1967, the Fifth
Circuit allowed a Title VI class action in Bossier Parish School Board
v. Lemon2' which became the precedent for other federal court deci-
sions involving private actions under Title VI.25 The majority dismissed
18. 441 U.S. at 698-99. The Court cited Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916), as its primary authority for implying the intent to benefit a class directly from the
language of the statute. In Rigsby, the Court implied a private cause of action for
employees by looking to the statutory language of railroad safety legislation which re-
ferred to "any employee of any such common carrier." Similarly, in Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Court interpreted statutory language of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as implying a private right of action for citizens to seek declaratory
judgments against a state. The Cannon court noted that the language of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was similar to Title IX. 441 U.S. at 690.
19. 441 U.S. at 693-94. Justice Stevens observed that the presence of "right-creating"
language in a statute virtually insures that a private cause of action will be implied. As
support for this view, he noted that with a single exception, the Court has always implied
a cause of action when the language of the statute conferred a right on a class of persons
that included the plaintiff. Id at 690 n.13.
20. Id at 694. See 422 U.S. at 82.
21. 441 U.S. at 694.
22. See notes 2 & 7 supra.
23. 441 U.S. at 696.
24. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
25. 441 U.S. at 696 n.20. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Shannon v. United States Dept. of
Vol. 18:983
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the respondents' argument that the pre-Title IX cases were actually
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983' instead of on Title VI. The Court ruled that
even though some cases were arguably brought under section 1983,
other controversies involving private defendants or the federal govern-
ment had to have been based upon Title VI. Because Justice Stevens
presumed that Congress was aware of the construction given to Title
VI, he concluded that Congress wanted Title IX to be construed in the
same manner.
28
The Court next assessed the third factor of Cort, which counsels re-
straint if the implication of a private remedy would frustrate the
underlying legislative purpose. The majority noted, however, that re-
straint would be improper if a private remedy advanced the purpose of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation
Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing
Auth., 341 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972); Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc.
v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.
La. 1969).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
27. 441 U.S. at 696 n.21. The Court cited Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n,
341 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972), as an example of a Title VI case involving a private
defendant. In Kenbridge, the discriminatory membership practices of a nonprofit corpora-
tion, which had received a federally guaranteed loan, were held in violation of Title VI.
Id. at 1384. The federal government was a defendant in the following Title VI cases:
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nora. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
U.S. 284 (1976) (secretary of HUD violated Title VI and due process clause of fifth amend-
ment by constructing racially discriminatory public housing); Shannon v. United
States Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (secretary of HUD
violated the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-1469 (1976), Title VI, and Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976), due to segregative effect of
housing project location); Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331
F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (United States Secretary of Treasury violated Title VI and
Aid to Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 633-647 (1976), by granting loans to "Black Front"
corporations); and Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) (Secretary of HUD
violated Title VI and due process clause of the fifth amendment by locating public housing
projects in racially segregated neighborhoods).
28. 441 U.S. at 697-98. The court also relied on § 718 of the Education Amendments,
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), as evidence of the congressional assumption that a private right of
action was available under Title VI. Section 718 authorizes federal courts to award fees to
the prevailing parties in private actions brought against local educational agencies, states,
state agencies, and the United States to enforce Title VI in the context of elementary and
secondary education. The Court also looked to the legislative history of § 718 which indi-
cated that private actions could be brought when necessary to enforce Title VI. 441 U.S.
at 700 n.28.
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the statute. Having stated the controlling principles, Justice Stevens
identified the two objectives of Title IX. The first purpose, prevention
of the expenditure of federal monies to support discriminatory prac-
tices, was adequately accomplished by terminating the federal funding
of institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.' However, the
Court found that Title IX was also intended to protect individuals from
discriminatory practices, and the funding termination provision was in-
adequate to accomplish this purpose. The Court reasoned that the indi-
vidual victim of sex discrimination prefers an individual remedy, not
the complete cutoff of federal monies.0 The majority was also influ-
enced by HEW's position that a private remedy would aid in the en-
forcement of Title IX without interfering with the agency's enforce-
ment responsibility under the Act."
Finally, the Court considered whether a federal remedy for sex
discrimination would infringe upon an area of traditional state concern.
As it did with the first three inquiries under Cort, the majority con-
cluded that the fourth factor weighed in favor of Cannon, because the
protection of citizens against invidious discrimination has historically
been a federal function, and in this case, a federal power to regulate
was derived from the expenditure of federal funds. Justice Stevens
concluded his Cort analysis by remarking that all relevant factors sup-
ported the implication of a private cause of action for the victims of
sex discrimination.2
The Court then rejected the respondents' argument that a private
action under Title IX would place an undue burden on educational in-
stitutions by necessitating the defense of individual lawsuits brought
by unsuccessful applicants. Justice Stevens stated that Congress re-
jected the same argument when adopting Title VI and Title -IX. The
majority reasoned that the provision for the cutoff of federal funds in
the administrative enforcement scheme was a greater burden to educa-
tional institutions than that presented by individual lawsuits.3
The Court concluded by stating that if Congress intends a private
right of action, an express provision specifying the right is a far better
29. 441 U.S. at 704. See note 9 supra.
30. 441 U.S. at 704-05.
31. I& at 706-08. The universities had urged the Court to permit individual suits only
after exhaustion of the available administrative remedies. This invitation was declined by
Justice Stevens, who noted that the Court has always implied a private remedy when the
statute explicitly confers a benefit on a class of people but does not assure the class
members the ability to participate in the agency investigation and enforcement action.
Justice Stevens observed that HEW had pointed out that neither Title IX nor the
agency's complaint procedure envisioned such individual participation. Id at 706 n.41.
32. Id at 708-09.
33. Id. at 709-10.
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course than silence. However, because all the factors identified in Cort
v. Ash as supportive of an implied remedy weighed in favor of Cannon,
the majority held that she could maintain her suit despite the absence
of express authorization in the statute.'
In dissent, Justice White attacked the implication of a Title IX right
of action in light of what he viewed to be a controlling legislative in-
tent to deny such a right. He maintained that Title VI was not in-
tended to provide a new cause of action against private parties who
previously had been under no statutory or constitutional obligation not
to discriminate.' Justice White's reading of the legislative history of
Title VI convinced him that Congress believed private suits would be
brought to enforce the prohibitions against racial discrimination only
to the extent that private suits were authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Private suits, therefore, were authorized solely when the prohibited
discrimination was carried out under color of state law. But Justice
White found no legislative support for the proposition that lawsuits
were contemplated against recipients of federal funds who were not
acting under color of state law. Thus, if the discrimination was prac-
ticed by private parties or institutions, no private remedy was in-
tended."
Justice White criticized the majority's position that Congress had
reason to believe that the courts had inferred a private cause of action
under Title VI when it enacted Title IX.37 To him, this rationale
perpetuated the confusion engendered by decisions such as Bossier.
The dissent contended that Bossier was a classic example of a court
failing to distinguish between a right of action pursuant to section 1983
to vindicate federal rights denied under color of state law and the crea-
tion of a new cause of action to remedy purely private acts of discrimi-
nation.' Bossier, then, was correct only to the extent that a state
34. Id at 717. Justice Rehnquist wrote specially to emphasize his concern about the
failure of Congress to expressly identify private causes of action in statutes intended to
benefit a designated class of individuals. He stated that in the future, the Court should be
extremely reluctant to imply a private cause of action. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring).
35. Id at 718 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White essentially repeated his dissent in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). In
Bakke, Justices Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens expressly based the white male
student's right of action to contest the alleged racially discriminatory admissions program
of the university medical school on Title VI. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell assumed for purposes of the case that Title VI was applicable, but found it un-
necessary to resolve this question because it was neither argued nor decided in the lower
courts.
36. 441 U.S. at 722-24 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 725-26 (White, J., dissenting). See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
38. 441 U.S. at 725-26 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger was a member of
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entity entitled the plaintiffs in Bossier to enforce the prohibition of
Title VI because section 1983 authorized such a suit. However, the sug-
gestion in Bossier that an individual always has a right to enforce a
statute designed for his protection was erroneous. Justice White main-
tained that a principled reading of the legislative histories of Title VI
and Title IX would show that Congress intended to eradicate private
acts of discrimination by relying on the authority of the federal
government to enforce the terms under which federal funds would be
provided. 9
Justice Powell also filed a dissenting opinion based on his belief that
the majority's approach endangered the separation of judicial and
legislative powers. Justice Powell asserted that federal judges are
relatively uninformed and isolated from the political process, and, ab-
sent express congressional intent, should not assume the legislative
role and create a cause of action.4' He was alarmed that since Cort v.
Ash, the various courts of appeals had rendered twenty decisions im-
plying private actions from federal statutes." To him, this was proof
that Cort was an open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes
of action not authorized by the Congress, because it was unlikely that
Congress forgot to mention an intended private action in each of the
statutes construed by the lower federal judiciary." Because he viewed
the implication doctrine of Cort as promoting an unconstitutional
course of judicial and legislative conduct," he suggested that Cort be
overruled." The dissenter also noted his concern about the impact Can-
non will have on academic freedom. He feared that the threat of
burdensome defense litigation might lead institutions to establish more
the panel that decided Bossier. Despite the Cannon court's sharp split over Bossier, the
Chief Justice offered only one sentence stating that he concurred in the judgment. Id. at
717 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. Id. at 725-26 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also refuted the majority's
reasoning that § 718 of the Education Amendments, authorizing attorney's fees to liti-
gants under Title VI, demonstrated a legislative intent to imply a private right of action
under Title VI. In his view, the fees were only intended to cover § 1983 suits, which in-
cluded suits against state and local educational agencies. Id. at 727 (White, J., dissenting).
See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
40. 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 741 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. Justice Powell maintained that Cort subverts the policymaking function of the
legislative branch because it provides Congress with an opportunity to avoid resolution of
controversial questions by leaving the issue to the courts to decide. Id. at 742 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting). As an alternative, Justice Powell stated that a
private action should be implied from a federal statute only if shown by the "most com-
pelling evidence" that Congress intended to create such an action. Id. at 749 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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objective admission procedures in lieu of flexible admissions criteria.
Justice Powell contended that such a potentially serious infringement
upon academic freedom should be dealt with by the legislature, not the
judiciary."
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court set out the analytical framework
for a judicial determination of whether an implied right of action exists
in a statute otherwise silent on the subject." The four factors
enumerated in Court were a combination of previously enunciated ele-
ments used by the Court to determine the appropriateness of an im-
plied cause of action. 7 Although Cort was decided in 1975, the Cannon
Court had little guidance for the application of the analytical frame-
work to civil rights litigation 8 because the predominant use of the
Cort analysis has been in cases involving the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934." The application of the Cort analysis to the securities area
45. Id. at 747-48 (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. See note 6 supra.
47. In Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the Court stated that statu-
tory language granting a special benefit to a class of persons supported the implication of
a private right of action for someone in that class. Id- at 39-40. See note 18 supra. See also
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Virginian Ry. v. System
Fed'n No. 40, 30 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930).
The importance of legislative intent to create or to deny a private right of action and
the limitation that the judiciary should imply a private action only if consistent with legis-
lative purpose were discussed by the Court in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See also Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (overall purpose and scheme of statute incompatible
with private right of action); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (private right of ac-
tion would interfere with purpose of administrative procedures). The relevance of
deciding whether an implied cause of action would interfere with an area of traditional
state concern was addressed by the Court prior to Cort v. Ash in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). In Cort, these
four factors were coalesced, but the relative weight to be given each factor was not dis-
cussed because all four factors were found to negate implication of a private cause of ac-
tion. 422 U.S. at 80.
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), was the only civil rights case
prior to Cannon in which the Supreme Court discussed the Cort factors. Title I of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976), was found to confer a
special benefit on the class of persons initiating the private suit, but the Court held that
implying a private right of action would interfere with the statute's other purpose of fur-
thering Indian self-government. Id. at 66-70.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976). In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court refused to imply a
private right of action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
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showed that if the statute lacked special benefit language, the Court
was cautious about implying congressional intent from the legislative
history." Since the post-Cort litigation had not involved statutes with
special benefit language, the question remained whether additional
evidence of legislative intent would be required when the statutory
language expressly conferred a benefit on a class of persons. Cannon
squarely raised this issue since the language of Title IX did confer a
special benefit on plaintiff's class.' Moreover, Cannon presented the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to apply the Cort factors to civil
rights statutes and to enhance civil rights enforcement by implying a
private cause of action.
The Cannon Court noted that it has never withheld a private
remedy when a statute conferred a special benefit on a class of which
the plaintiff is a member.' The Court's heavy reliance on the special
benefit language of the statute bodes well for implication of a private
right of action under existing civil rights legislation because, as the
Cannon Court, stated, the right to be free of discrimination is a per-
sonal one and a statute conferring such a right will often be phrased in
terms of a special benefit. 3 However, Cort requires an examination of
by § 3 of the Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), for unsuccessful tender
offerers in a corporate control contest. In discussing the four Cort factors, the Court
noted that no special benefit was conferred upon tender offerers by the language of the
statute. Therefore, the Court looked to the statute's legislative history to determine
whether the statute was intended to benefit the class. The Piper Court warned against in-
jecting judicial policy into legislative provisions, and proposed the cautious use of the
legislative histories as a "guide" to congressional intent. 430 U.S. at 26. The Court deter-
mined that the purpose of the act was to benefit shareholders, not tender offerers. Id. at
35.
Likewise, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Court denied an implied private
right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
In Green, a group of minority shareholders brought suit against majority shareholders for
fraud and breach of a corporate fiduciary duty. The Court refused to expand coverage of
the statute to include conduct not involving manipulation or deception because the statu-
tory language was specific and the legislative history did not reflect a more expansive in-
tent. 430 U.S. at 473. An implied right of action was found not to be necessary to fulfill
the congressional purposes, and the state's traditional role in the corporate area was
given deference by the Court. Id at 477-78.
50. See note 49 supra.
51. See note 2 supra.
52. 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez represents the only case in
which the Court has refused to imply a private cause of action under a statute with ex-
plicit benefit language. The Cannon Court distinguished Martinez, which involved Indian
rights, from other civil rights legislation because of the unique characteristics of Indian
tribe self-government. Id See note 48 supra.
53. 441 U.S. at 690 n.13. The Cannon Court reasoned that when Congress patterns
the language of a statute after that contained in Title VI, it does so with the intent to
create a private right of action. This rationale points favorably to implication of a private
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three additional factors before implying a private right of action. ' Only
one of these additional inquiries-whether implication of a private
right of action under federal law would infringe upon an area of tradi-
tional state concern-pointed toward implication of a private action in
Cannon.5
Although Cort requires a search for legislative intent to create or
deny a private right of action, the Cannon Court specifically noted that
when special benefit language is present in the statute, a showing of
an intent to create a private action is not necessary." This indicates
that the Court views the existence of special benefit language as con-
trolling. Despite this presumption, the Court nevertheless engaged in a
search for legislative intent to create a private right of action under
Title IX. As support for the proposition that Congress intended to
have a cause of action implied under Title IX, the Court cited lower
court precedents that had implied a cause of action under the similar
benefit language of Title VI prior to the enactment of Title IX. To the
Court, this meant that Congress selected the special benefit language
of Title IX with the understanding that it would also be interpreted as
implying a private right of action. 7
right under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 uses
language identical to that of Title VI and Title IX, and sets forth the same administrative
scheme. The section provides in relevant part: "No otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." The Seventh Circuit has allowed a private right of action
under this Act. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). However,
the future implications of the decision are uncertain because, at the time of the decision,
no administrative regulations had been promulgated providing for judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions. Id. at 1286 n.29. The Lloyd court noted that the question of whether
a private suit could be brought after regulations were issued was premature. The court
added that, if a meaningful administrative enforcement mechanism existed, judicial review
would be limited to a review of the agency's enforcement activities. Id In Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), a case decided after Cannon, the
Supreme Court held that an educational institution's rejection of a hearing-disabled
applicant did not violate § 504. However, because the claim was rejected on the merits,
the Court found it unnecessary to decide if an implied cause of action existed under § 504.
Id. at 404 n.5. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Cannon to find a private right of action under Title VI and § 504,
even in the absence of exhaustion of the administrative remedies. NAACP v. Medical
Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
54. See note 6 supra.
55. As the Court noted, protection against discrimination has long been a function of
the federal courts. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Additionally, Title IX in-
volves the expenditures of federal funds. 441 U.S. at 708-09.
56. 441 U.S. at 694. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
57. 441 U.S. at 696-97. Respondents agreed that, since Title IX was patterned after
Title VI, if a private right of action existed under Title VI, one also existed under Title
IX. Brief for Respondents at 16.
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The Cannon Court relied heavily on Bossier Parish School Board v.
Lemon58 as the first case to imply a private right of action under Title
VI. The court in Bossier expressly stated that the plaintiffs could main-
tain their class action under either section 601"9 of Title VI or as third
party beneficiaries to contractual assurances between the school board
and the federal government. Whether the Bossier court based the
cause of action on section 601, or on the violation of constitutional
rights cognizable by the court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is uncertain. The
Bossier court referred to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights through-
out the opinion."' The court also spoke of section 601 as if it were a
codification of constitutional principles, stating that "section 601 also
states the law as laid down in hundreds of decisions, independent of
the statute." 2 Since the defendant in Bossier was a local public school
board and the alleged infringement of the black students' rights was
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment, 3 the plaintiffs' claim was cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Despite this section 1983 basis for the cause of action,
the Bossier court stated that in the absence of a procedure through
which the protected individuals could assert their rights under section
601, violations of the law were cognizable by the courts on behalf of
the plaintiffs. 5
The confusion of Bossier was repeated in subsequent Title VI deci-
sions. The Cannon majority stated that four cases brought under Title
VI against the federal government and one case brought against a pri-
vate defendant could not have been brought under the auspices of sec-
58. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See note 7 supra.
60. 370 F.2d at 851.
61. Id. at 849, 851, 852.
62. Id at 852.
63. Id. at 851.
64. Section 1983 is the traditional basis for suits against school boards. See, e.g.,
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See also 441 U.S. at 725-26 (White, J.,
dissenting).
65. 370 F.2d at 852. The Bossier court also stated that the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries
of the Act, had standing to assert their § 601 rights. Statutory standing involves the ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff is within the class of persons to whom Congress extended the
right to sue under the statute. The issue of whether a plaintiff has standing under article
III of the Constitution is reached only after a determination of statutory standing has
been made. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). The issue of
statutory standing is often confused with the question of whether a private right of action
exists. See Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sym-
pathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978). See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40
n.18 (1979).
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tion 1983.8 However, the existence of a private cause of action under
Title VI was not squarely decided in any of these cases. Furthermore,
in two of the cases, it is unclear whether the cause of action was based
on Title VI, another statute,"' or the Administrative Procedure Act. 8
Thus, the Cannon Court's presumption that Congress understood the
inconsistent opinion in Bossier and its progeny to imply a private right
of action under Title VI is much weaker than the Court's opinion sug-
gests. The absence of a well-reasoned, authoritative decision recog-
nizing an implied right of action under Title VI would seem to indicate
that Congress most likely considered the status of an implied right of
action under Title VI to be an open question. 9
66. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Since a prerequisite for a § 1983 claim
is state action, suits against private defendants and the federal government cannot be
brought under the auspices of § 1983. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
67. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), was based on the interrelationship
between the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-1469 (1976), Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976), and Title VI. The case involved a
challenge to the adequacy of HUD procedures under the Housing Act. Title VI was
discussed in terms of its substantive effect on the Housing Act. Because the administra-
tive remedies under Title VI had no bearing on HUD's practices under the Housing Act,
the court held that Title VI remedies did not have to be exhausted. 436 F.2d at 820.
In Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D.
Mich. 1971), a suit against the federal government was brought under the Small Business
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976), and Title VI. The court allowed the claims to be brought
under Title VI because an effective disposition of the plaintiff's claim under the Small
Business Act could not be made without consideration of the underlying discrimination.
The court referred to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) as authorizing any person aggrieved by
agency action under Title VI to obtain judicial review. However, this section authorizes
suits only against agencies, not against a private party. The court, citing Bossier, noted
that the strong federal policy favoring judicial resolution of racial discrimination claims
had led other courts to give plaintiffs standing to challenge alleged violations of Title VI.
331 F. Supp. at 944-45. In light of-the interplay between the Small Business Act, Title VI,
and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976), and because
Southern Christian Leadership Conference was a suit to review agency action, this state-
ment by the court lends little support to the implication of private right of action under
Title VI.
68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). In Shannon, the court determined that HUD's
action under the Housing Act was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. In
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the court determined that the Small Business
Administration's action was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. See
note 67 supra.
69. The Cannon court also assumed a legislative presumption of the availability of
Title VI private suits from the language of § 718 of the Education Amendments enacted
in 1972. See note 11 supra. The Court noted that because there was no cause of action
available for many suits covered by § 718, Congress must have assumed that one could be
implied under Title VI. 441 U.S. at 699-700. Although there is precedent for giving weight
to subsequent legislative interpretations of statutes, see, e.g., Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942); New York, P. & N.R.R. v. Peninsula Produce Exch., 240 U.S.
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The Court engaged in these weak assumptions about legislative in-
tent to create a right of action despite its statement that Cort requires
no such showing when the statute contains special benefit language.
This may be due to the Court's desire to avoid criticism for overstep-
ping proper judicial bounds in implying a Title IX private right of ac-
tion. However, the twisted attempt to find legislative intent raises the
very problem the Court presumably was attempting to avoid. The ma-
jority contravened the Court's own proscription in Piper v. Chris Craft
Industries, Inc."5 against injecting Court policy into legislative provi-
sions." Nevertheless, the Cannon Court's reasoning is significant, since
right or wrong, the Court went out of its way to show that Congress
understood the language of Title VI as creating a private right of ac-
tion.72
The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the legislative
history of Title VI demonstrated an intent to deny a Title VI private
right of action.7 Additionally, the heavy emphasis that the Court
placed on the special benefit language of Title IX would also apply to
an interpretation of Title VI, lending even more weight to the implica-
tion of a Title VI right of action. Therefore, by its reasoning, Cannon
seems to establish that a private right of action exists under both
Titles VI and IX.
In addition to an examination of legislative intent, Cort v. Ash also
necessitates a determination of the underlying purpose of the legisla-
tive scheme. The Cannon Court found that the purposes of Title IX are
to avoid the use of federal funds to support discriminatory practices
and to protect individuals against these practices.74 The majority
framed the issue as whether the legislative purpose was to protect in-
dividuals from discrimination rather than whether the purpose was to
protect individuals from discrimination through private suits. The need
articulated by the Court for a private remedy was based on their own
perceptions about what would constitute an adequate remedy for vic-
34 (1916), nothing in § 718 expressly supports the contention that Congress assumed that
Title VI implied a private right of action. Section 1983 can provide a basis for many
private causes of action brought under Title VI. Therefore, it is not clear that in pro-
viding attorney's fees to Title VI litigants, Congress necessarily assumed that Title VI im-
plied a private right of action.
70. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 49 supra.
71. 430 U.S. at 26.
72. The Supreme Court discussed the issue of a Title VI right of action in Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), but did not decide the question since it had
not been addressed in the lower courts. ML at 283-84. See note 35 and accompanying text
supra.
73. 441 U.S. at 710-16.
74. IdL at 704.
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tims of prohibited discrimination. 5 Additionally, the Court emphasized
the importance of HEW's contention that there is no inconsistency be-
tween the administrative enforcement scheme of the statute and a
private right of action." Thus, in examining the Cort factor addressed
to determining legislative purpose" the Court relied upon its own
perceptions and those of the executive branch that a private remedy
was necessary.
An examination of the Cannon opinion reveals that the Court was
swayed by the special benefit language and the perceived inadequacy
of the statutory remedy. Because the statutory remedy was viewed as
inadequate, the Court not only implied a private right of action but
also dispensed with the traditional requirement that administrative
remedies be exhausted prior to the initiation of a private suit."8 A
primary purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to avoid premature
interruption of the administrative process, especially when the ad-
ministrative function and ruling involve congressionally granted agency
discretion based on a developed expertise.7" The requirement of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies also encourages autonomy and
judicial efficiency and avoids weakening the effectiveness of agency en-
forcement." Exhaustion has, therefore, been ordered when an available
administrative remedy has not been pursued,8 and when the adminis-
trative remedy was perceived as adequate. 2 None of these traditional
factors militating in favor of exhaustion were found to exist by the
Cannon Court. HEW was not actively investigating Cannon's claim at
the time of the suit, thereby eliminating the potential for judicial inter-
ruption of an administrative process." Furthermore, HEW was not
75. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
76. 441 U.S. at 706-07.
77. In a decision subsequent to Cannon, the Supreme Court stated that the first
three factors in the Cort analysis are merely tools to determine legislative intent. See
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
78. 441 U.S. 706 n.41.
79. See, e.g., North Philadelphia Community Bd. v. Temple Univ., 330 F. Supp. 1107
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
80. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
81. See, e.g., Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
- 82. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 285, 292-93 (1963). See also Note, A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action,
48 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 526 (1980).
83. In April, 1975, Cannon filed a complaint with the local office of HEW. Three
months later, she had received only an acknowledgment that her letter had been received
by HEW. She then filed suit in district court. She was later informed that HEW would
not begin its investigation until early 1976. In June, 1976, HEW informed her that the
local stages of its investigation had been completed but that its national headquarters
planned to conduct a further study. At the time of the Supreme Court appeal, HEW had
taken no further action in the case. 441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
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advocating administrative autonomy, but rather was asking for the im-
plication of a private right of action to help in enforcement." Cannon
pursued the express Title IX administrative remedy, found it inadequate,
then sought judicial relief. The Supreme Court agreed that Cannon's
administrative remedy was inadequate because she could not partici-
pate in the enforcement action nor be granted individual relief. 5 The
Court's emphasis on Cannon's inability to participate in the adminis-
trative process clarifies its previous position in Rosado v. Wyman"
that exhaustion is not required when the aggrieved party can neither
initiate nor participate in the administrative enforcement action. After
Rosado, the question remained whether exhaustion would be required
if the aggrieved party could initiate, but not participate in, the enforce-
ment action. 7 The Cannon Court's answer is that exhaustion is not
required if the individual cannot participate in the administrative pro-
cess. Participation, then, is an indispensable component of an adequate
administrative remedy, because it ensures that a thorough investiga-
tion will be made.
Taken as a whole, Cannon indicates that when a statute creates a
right to be free of discrimination, but does not also provide a mecha-
nism that is sufficient to ensure vindication of that right, the Court
will imply a private action in order to protect the statutory benefici-
aries. The majority's suggestion that Congress clearly specify an in-
tended private cause of action in the future88 indicates that the Court
may be hesitant to imply private rights of action under statutes
enacted in the future. However, for civil rights legislation existing
prior to the decision, Cannon v. University of Chicago is a victory for
civil rights proponents convinced of the necessity for judicial vindica-
tion of the rights of injured statutory beneficiaries.
Kathy Condo-Caritis
84. Id at 687 n.8.
85. Id. at 706 n.41.
86. 397 U.S. 397 (1970). Rosado involved a class action by New York welfare recipi-
ents challenging the constitutionality of a New York statute which provided disparate
welfare payments to recipients from different counties. An HEW administrative pro-
cedure for reviewing state plans under the welfare program was required by statute. This
procedure included notice to the noncomplying state and an opportunity for a hearing,
with the ultimate sanction being a partial or total funding cutoff. The state could seek
judicial review of any HEW action. Id at 406 n.8. The Rosado court noted that a court
should solicit an administrative agency's views concerning the application of the agency's
standards to a particular state regulation or program. Id at 406-07.
87. In Cannon, the individual plaintiff could initiate the administrative process
through a complaint procedure adopted by HEW. 441 U.S. at 706 n.41.
88. Id. at 717.
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